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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and
BERNICE B. CASTAGNO, his
wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
CASE NO. 14412

vs.
MELVIN CHURCH and ESTHER
C. CHURCH, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.
* * * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Albert J0 Castagno and Bernice B 0 Castagno

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-respondents
for Breach of Contract by defendants-appellants under provisions of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the lower court
asking for specific performance of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract or in the alternative for money damages•

The

issues were tried to the Court setting without a jury*
The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment requiring the defendants to specifically perform
the provisions of the Contract with respect to conveyance of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the real property; relieved defendants' of their obligation
to convey one second foot of water and awarded plaintiffs
a $12,000,00 abatement of the contract price for failure
to furnish the one second foot of water.
From this Judgment defendants appeal,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the trial court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For clarity, the plaintiffs-respondents will be
referred to as buyers and defendants-appellants will be
referred to as sellers.
Seller Melvin Church by profession is a well driller.
Sellers were owners of 40 acres of land upon which Sellers
had drilled a well for water planning to later transfer
to the well through approval of an application for a change
of point of diversion a water right Seller had obtained
in another water district known as the Buzianis right*
Sellers and Buyers duly entered into an Earnest Money
Agreement for sale to the Buyers of the 40 acres of land
together with one second foot of water; the well already
drilled upon the land, and a pump adequate to pump one
second foot of water.
Seller Melvin Church made application to the State
Engineers' office requesting a change of point of diversion

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the Buzianis water right to the diversion point of the
well drilled upon the 40 acres. The application was denied.
Discussion with the State Engineers1 Office revealed
the possibility of another source of water, the point of
diversion of which might be successfully diverted to the
location point of the well on the subject 40 acres.
Assignments of the other water right (known as the
Barnard Castagno (deceased) right) was effected.
The Sellers and Buyers executed a Uniform Real Estate
Contract on December 14, 1973, incorporating therein the
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement previously entered
into.
Pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract Buyers
were to pay Sellers $32,000.00 as a total purchase price,
at 87o interest per annum, of which $16,000.00 was paid
as a cash down payment and the remaining balance was to
be paid at $2,500.00 per year beginning December 15, 1974,
and a like sum annually thereafter until the purchase price
was paid in full.
For that consideration Sellers were to convey to
Buyers forty (40) acres of land, one second foot of water,
a well certificate #

and an electric pump sufficient

to pump one second foot of water.
Twenty (20) acres of land was to be deeded to Buyers
upon down payment, which was done, the next contiguous
ten (10) acres was to be deeded upon payment of the next

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$8,000o00 and the final ten (10) acres was to be deeded
upon payment in full of the contract,.
Buyers were to take possession of the property on
the 1st day of January, 1974, and have exclusive use of
the said well and electric pump and two second feet of
water from said well during the period of the contract•
Sellers further agreed to drill an additional six
(6) inch well on the premises for the sum of $500.00 which
was done.
The Buyers took possession, planted crops in the
Spring of 1973, purchased a sprinkling system and attempted
to use water from the well on the property pursuant to the
terms of the contract, but were prevented from the use
thereof by the Utah State Engineers1 Office, Water Rights
Division.
The 1974 planting season passed and Buyers still
were without the use of the water.

Buyers paid the annual

$2,500.00 payment due December 1, 19740

Buyers then conveyed

a portion of the twenty (20) acres of land deeded from
Sellers to their daughter who constructed a new house on
the premises.

With the approach of the 1975 planting season,

Buyers were still without the use of the water and on March
13, 1975, tendered to Sellers full payment on the balance
of the purchase price.

Sellers did not convey the remaining

twenty acres of land nor the one second foot of water, and
on the 14th day of May, 1975, Buyers filed suit in the

-4-
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District Court.
The rule of law is so well fixed that authorities
need not be cited for the proposition that on appeal the
facts and the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below0

In this respect,

it should be noted that the sellers do not, in their brief
on appeal, specifically take issue or object to any Findings of Fact made and entered by the Court below, nor do
the sellers claim that any finding is unsupported by evidence«
It is suggested therefore, that the appellate court rely
on the facts as they were found by the District Court0
Even though the sellers, in their Statement of Facts,
restate certain minor portions of the evidence and choose
to disregard the uncontroverted Findings of Fact made and
entered by the Court, the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
are as follows:
"la

That the plaintiffs (buyers) have performed

fully the terms of the Contract at issue on their part,
20

That defendants (sellers) have failed to perform

that portion of the Contract in which they agreed to provide one second foot of water and the Court finds that
the defendants were unable at the time of trial to perform0
3o

The Court finds that the real property described

in the Contract is of the value of $l,500o00 per acre, provided one second foot of water is available.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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That the

reasonable value of the property without one second foot
of water provided is $500*00 per acre and therefore plaintiffs should be awarded specific performance of the Contract
and rebate of the terms of the Contract in the amount of
$12,000o00o"

(Findings of Fact p. 1,2)

The buyers1 full performance referred to in the Findings of Fact was the tendering of all monies due and owing
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, (Tra 16 & 110).
The sellers1 breach was their failure to convey the remaining
twenty acres to the buyers and their failure to provide
one second foot of water pursuant to the terms of the Contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTRACT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
Sellers attempt in their Brief on Appeal to undermine
the clear and exact provisions of the contract concerning
the water right to be conveyed to the buyers.

However, the

Contract between the parties is explicit concerning the
water rights to be conveyedo

The relevant provisions thereof

setting forth the sellers1 obligation to transfer a water
right to the buyers are as follows:
"Together with electric pump and all water rights
including one second foot of water in and to well
certificate #
. Said pump sufficient to pump
one second foot of water,'1 (Ex. 1-P Contract, P.l)
"Upon payment in full of said contract price,
sellers will convey by warranty deed the final
easterly contiguous Ten (10) acres of said property, together with all water right to Well

-6-
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already drilled upon said property Certificate
#
including Two (2) second feet of water,
one second foot of which Buyer will furnish.
Seller to Deed therewith an electric pump for
said Well. Sellers guarrantee said Pump and Well
Certificate #
for one (1) year after date
hereof. Said electric pump sufficient to pump
one second foot of water.
Sellers further agree that Buyers shall have exclusive use of said Well and electric pump and
2 second feet of water from said Well until and
during the period of said Contract until paid in
full a11 (Exol-P Contract, P. 3)
That these and the remaining provisions of the Contract
were clear and unambiguous, that Sellers and Buyers clearly
understood the obligations of each in performance thereof
is clear from the testimony of each at the trial. Buyer,
Albert Castagno, testified he was familiar with the terms
of the Contract, (Tr0 P6 line 3-21), that both parties read
the Contract, made corrections therein and initialed the
same.

(Tr. P6 Line 22-30, P7 Line 1-3) 0
That the down payment was made and Sellers delivered

to Buyers an executed Warranty Deed for Twenty Acres of
the property. (Tr. P7 Line 4-16)„
At the trial, Seller, Melvin Church testified that
it was his intention at the time the Contract was executed
to abide by its terms in obtaining one second foot of water
and conveying that right to the buyers. (Tr. 87). He also
testified that he had obtained the one second foot of water
to convey to the buyers but was not ready to convey it to
them. (Tre 88).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Melvin Church's understanding and intention to sell
the land with one second foot of water thereon was also
clear from his testimony as to his attempts to obtain or
transfer water rights to said property subsequent to the
execution of the original Earnest Money Agreement entered
into between the parties in 19720 (Tra 83).
This Court has stated in Hardings Co 0 v 0 Eimco Corp0>
1 Uto 2d 320, 323; 226 P,2d 494 (1954), that ". . . in the
interpretation of contracts, the interpretation given by
the parties themselves as shown by their acts will be adopted by the Courto"
Melvin Churchfs original attempt to transfer water
to the subject property was a right he had previously acquired,
known as the "Buzianis" righto

This attempt was prevented

by the State Engineers1 Office when it would not allow the
requested change from one water district to another,(Tr0
39-40)o

Melvin Church thereafter attempted to have another

water right, known as the "Bernard Castagno" right transferred
to the subject property,,

The buyers did not oppose Churchs f

attempts to procure or transfer these other water rights
to the subject property.

The parties had already entered

an earnest money agreement: for the sale of the land including
one second foot of water, and the sellers1 failure to obtain
the water would also be detrimental to the buyers1 interest
in the property0

In fact, the buyers took affirmative steps

to help sellers procure the water the sellers were obligated

-8-
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to provide. (Tr0 56-57).

Even though all subsequent attempts

by Melvin Church to transfer water rights to the subject
property were prevented by the State Engineer, the sellers1
obligation under the Contract to supply one second foot
of water was always clear and the buyers1 attempts to help
the defendants perform by obtaining other rights never
relieved the sellers of their obligation to supply the
one second foot of water.

It was never asserted by sellers

at trial nor should the assertions now be entertained that
the terms of the Contract were so ambiguous that the sellers
did not intend or know of their obligation to furnish one
second foot of water•
The testimony of seller, Melvin Church, as to his
intent to furnish the one second foot of water and his
testimony as to his conduct in attempting to furnish it
completely refute that the Contract terms relative to the
sellers furnishing one second foot of water were ambiguous.
Appellants (sellers) in their brief allege that the
Contract between the parties was ambiguous since there is
a blank after "well certificate #

", in the Contracts'

provisions and assert it was the understanding of the buyers
at the time the contract was executed that the term "well
certificate #

" meant a specific water right already

existing upon the property0
Prior to the time the buyers took possession of the
first twenty acres of the subject property, there was a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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well and pump already installed thereon by Melvin Church9
(Tr# 20)o

Both sellers and buyers were knowledgeable of

this fact at the time of execution of the Contract and
knew no identifying number had been assigned by the State
Engineerfs Office to that well.
certificate #

The meaning of "well

" was clearly and adequately under-

stood and explained by buyer, Albert Castagno, at the
trial when he testified on cross-examination as follows:
"QUESTION: I note on the contract, Mr* Castagno,
that the contract and the exhibit refer to a certain
number and that there is then a line and itfs
blank; can you tell to what that referred?
ANSWER:

Referred to the well permito

QUESTION: I see* And by that you mean a
permit from the State Engineer for the use of
water?
ANSWER: For the drilling of the well*
was the well number,

It

QUESTION: In other words, you are referring
to merely the permit to drill the well, not to
the water right itself?
ANSWER: True. That is the number -- should
be the number permit to drill the well, but we
don't know for sure what the number is,
QUESTION: I see. Are you now aware as to
what the number is?
ANSWER: We have a number but we're not sure
itfs the proper one,11 (Tr0 20, Lines 5-21) 0
The plain meaning of the words "well certificate
#

ff

is self evident and the explanation as to its

meaning given by the Buyer, Albert Castagno, at the time
of the trial was uncontrovertedo

-10-

Therefore, appellants
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argument that "well certificate #

" meant a specific

water right in the mind of the buyer at time of execution
of the Contract thereby making the contract ambiguous
is specious and not consistent with the testimony at the
trial.

That testimony clearly indicated that in the minds

of the sellers and buyers and in actuality there were never
any water rights existing upon the subject property at
the time the Contract was entered into.

In fact, appellants1

attorney acknowledged this fact at the trial when he stated
the following, concerning the Contract. (Tr* 24).
"Mr. JEPPESEN: It (the Contract) provides
that the well is sufficient to pump at least
one second foot and the pump will pump one
second foot, and that Mr. Church was selling
all water rights including one second foot
of water in it to the well; certainly applicable
to that particular well and I submit, Your
Honor, that at the time the contract was executed, the parties knew that there was in
fact no water rights pertinent or assigned,"
(Emphasis added)
The only thing that existed upon the property when the
Contract was executed was a well unidentified by number,
drilled by the sellers, as was reflected in the Contract.
The Contract provisions were unambiguous to the
trial court which had the prerogative to interpret the
provisions in light of the evidence and should be sustained
therein.
In Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 17
Ut.2d 32, 36; 404 P.2d 30 (1965), this Court said, "More

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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over, when there is such uncertainty in the language of
a contract, it is the prerogative of the trial court to
determine the proper interpretation in the light of the
evidence".
In the present case, the trial court rendered
its own interpretation which is the only plausible explanation of the clause at issue when it said:
THE COURT: ", .; . the way I read Paragraph
3 of the agreement that there is to be a
well that was adequate or would allow the
use of two second feet; and one of those
second feet Mr. Church (seller) was responsible for and if it took some further development and pumping to take care of an additional
second foot that would be the responsibility
of the buyer/1 (Tr. 23-24).
The buyers did not care where the sellers obtained
the water right to put in the well already drilled upon
the subject property their only concern was that the property
they had contracted for would have available the one second
foot of water bargained for,
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO LOOK
BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE CONTRACT
SINCE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS CLEAR
ON THE FACE OF THE CONTRACT, THE DOCTRINE
OF FRUSTRATION CAN BE SHOWN BY EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE AND THE COURT IN FACT PERMITTED
ALL TESTIMONY OFFERED BY APPELLANTS TO SHOW
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES REGARDING WATER
RIGHTS AND FRUSTRATION OF PERFORMANCE
It is clear that sellers, among other things,
intended to convey forty acres of land and one second foot
of water to the buyers pursuant to the terms of the Contract0
Appellants now contend the trial court erred in refusing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to hear testimony concerning the identity of the water
rights the sellers intended to supply.
This argument is simply not supported by the
record.

The Court, early in the trial proceedings, sus-

taining plaintiffs1 objection based upon the parol evidence
rule, refused to hear testimony concerning discussions
between the parties about the source of the water right
to be acquired.
Counsel for sellers, in their brief, argue it
was necessary to show the intention of the parties relative
to the source of the water right to be furnished and to
have been provided.

To do so would have shown sellers

frustration and impossibility to perform in supplying the
one second foot of water.

The Court indicated in sustain-

ing plaintiffs1 (buyers1) objection that "That's another
matter, isnft it, Mr. Jeppesen, as to whether or not there
has been any rights actually acquired." (Tr. 24 Line 1416)
The Court clearly was not preventing sellers,
by sustaining the objection, from showing frustration and
impossibility to perform.

Counsel for appellants was direct-

ing his remarks to other matters which were correctly objected to and properly sustained by the Court on the basis
of parol evidence.

Counsel for appellant stated, "This

contract was only one document of a continuing business
agreement between the parties to develope water and land
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

in Grantsville,o . /'(Tr. 25, Lines 9-14).

The Court replied,

11

. . obut at this state of the proceeding
I am not convinced that we should go beyond
the borders of this agreement. As the evidence
may develop later that may be and you may renew
that request, Mr. Jeppesen,, Itfs denied at
this time. (Tr. 25, Lines 17-21).
Later in the proceedings the Court did allow
testimony concerning the identity of water rights in existence at the time the Contract was entered into and testimony concerning the sellers1 efforts to obtain other identified water rights for the subject property.
The court in permitting this testimony stated
the following:
THE COURT: ". . .what the Court would permit
you to do, if you so desire, is to offer any
testimony that there might be as to whether
there was in fact in existence any water right
at the time this Contract was entered into."
(Tr. 44).
THE COURT: ". . .1 would permit some parol
testimony here if it can be viewed as such
as to what the intention of the parties were
concerning this furnishing of a one second
foot of water. It appears on the face of this
agreement that there was to be a second foot
of water furnished by the defendant. Now,
if he represented that he had a second foot
that he could furnish that's one thing; and
if he represented he had no rights when he
was going to get: them that's something else."
(Tr. 45).
Pursuant to the Court's direction testimony was
received concerning the identity of the water rights. Mr*
Rex Larsen, an employee of the State Engineers' Office,
testified about the sellers early attempts to get the
"Buzianis right" transferred to the subject property.(Tr. 48).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After that attempt had failed Rex Larsen outlined the steps
the sellers took to get the "Bernard Castagno right11 assigned to them and transferred to the subject property. (Tr.
50).
Melvin Church himself was allowed to specify those
certain water rights he attempted to obtain to perform
his part of the Contract(Tr. 90-91).

The sellers were

afforded ample opportunities during the trial to identify
the water rights they intended to supply the subject property.
The court did not err in refusing to look beyond
the four corners of the contract since the intent of the
parties was clear on the face of the contract, the doctrine
of frustration can be shown by extrinsic evidence, and the
court in fact permitted all testimony offered by appellants
to show the intent of the parties regarding water rights
and frustration of performance.

Thus it is clear that

appellants1 contention that the court did not afford them
the opportunity by sustaining the buyers* objection, to
identify the water rights and thereby show frustration
and impossibility to perform by supplying the one second
foot of water is totally without merit.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCUSED THE SELLERS FROM
SUPPLYING THE WATER UNDER THE CONTRACT AND
PROPERLY ABATED THE CONTRACT PRICE FOR SUCH
FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE.
Appellants in their brief on appeal have overlooked
the succint finding of the trial court that "the defendants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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were unable at the time of the trial to perform" with respect
to the one second foot of water to be conveyed to the buyers0
(Findings of Fact Tr0, 142, Lines 6-11).

Appellants have

set forth tedious accounts from the record concerning their
inability to so perform under the Contract.

This however

was specifically acknowledged by the trial court in its
findings.
Appellants argue that their inability to convey
the one second foot of water under the Contract invoked
the equitable doctrine of frustration to excuse their performance.

However appellants have also overlooked the fact

that the trial court did specifically excuse them from
conveying the one second foot of water to the buyers.

The

sellers were not required by the court to specifically perform
this

provision of the Contract since they were unable

to do sOo

In fact the trial court actually applied the

relief the appellants have suggested on appeal.

The sellers

were not required to acquire for the benefit of the buyers
or convey one second foot of water to the buyers and the
sellers were not required to pay for the water they had
previously bargained for but could not be supplied.

The

Court therefore made the following uncontroverted findings
of fact and conclusion:
". o othe Court now finds that the plaintiffs
have at all times performed under the terms
of the contract; that the defendants have

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failed to perform that portion of the contract
that provides for their furnishing one second
foot of water for the use of plaintiffs during
the term of the contract, and is now unable
to perform further by a conveyance of such
a water right and that the subject real property
has a vlaue of $1,500 per acre if one second
foot of water is available to irrigate the
same.
And that the reasonable value of one
second foot of water that the defendant failed to furnish and provide is $12,000."
"• o .and based upon those findings
the Court concludes that the plaintiffs are
entitled to specific performance of the contract
as it applies to the real estate portion
thereof; but since the defendants are unable
to perform that portion of the contract pertaining to the use and conveyance of one
second foot of water, an abatement of $12,000
of the purchase price of the contract is made.11
The specific performance ordered by the Court was
the conveyance of the remaining parcel of real property
provided by the Contract and did not deal with the water
rights.

Buyers did receive an abatement on the Contract

price for the value of the water unable to be furnished
by Sellers.
Hence the Court's decision was the most equitable
result that could have been possibly fashioned under the
circumstances.

The buyers had entered upon the property,

made improvements and conveyed a portion of it to their
daughter, and a total recission of the Contract would have
been extremely egregious and unwarranted under the facts.
The sellers were compelled to perform what they
could under the Contract by conveying the remaining parcel

-17-
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of land, but were further relieved of their obligation
to convey the one second foot of water„
This remedy is characterized as specific performance
with an abatement of the purchase price for the term not
performed and is outlined in 71 Am Jur 2d, Specific Performance, §129 as follows:
"In actions by a vendee for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of
real estate, where it appears that the vendor
is unable to make a complete or perfect title,
or that there is a deficiency in the quantity
of land contracted to be sold, the general
rule is that the vendee, if he so elects,
is not only entitled to have the contract
specifically performed to the extent of the
-endorfs ability to comply therewith by requiring him to give the best title he can or convey
hat he has, but he may compel the vendor to
convey his defective title or deficient estate,
and at the same time have a just abatement
out of the purchase price for the deficiency
f title, quantity, or quality of the estate
to compensate for the vendor's failure to
perform the contract in full*"
The court in the instant case required the sellers
to onvey to the buyers the deficient estate.

That is the

balanc e of the land without the water * The buyers were
awarded an abatement of the purchase price for the deficiency
of the quality of the estate, that is the failure of the
sellers to furnish the one second foot of water, the Court
thereby abated the contract price in the sum of $12,000.00
compensating the buyers for the sellers failure to perform
the contract in fullo
CONCLUSION
The Contract entered into by the parties was clear
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and unambiguous, with respect to the water rights to be
conveyed thereunder, and the Court did not err in refusing
to look beyond the four corners of the contract since the
intent of the parties was clear on the face of the contract,
the doctrine of frustration can be shown by extrinsic
evidence, and the court in fact permitted all testimony
offered by appellants to show the intent of the parties
regarding water rights and frustration of performance*
Whereupon the Court found the sellers unable to convey
the one second foot of water and further relieved them
of their responsibility to do so and abated the purchase
price accordingly.

Appellants have never argued that the

land should not have been conveyed under the Contract,
therefore the remedy effected by the Court was the only
just and equitable solution to all parties.
It should be noticed that appellants' counsel in
their argument has utilized testimony that was ordered
stricken from the record by the trial court which use is
certainly not in the best professional taste*
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 19760
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